Ancient Arabic literature dealt with linguistic sciences such as sarf, nahiw, belagha and Islamic sciences such as fıqh, hadith and tafsîr. This is known to the elite and the common people. But what is hidden and forgotten is that Arabic literature also includes the foundations and rules of modern sciences such as sociology and economics. Among the ancient Arabic literature is the writing of Maqamat, which holds an important position among the masterpieces of Arabic literature. For this reason, it is (...) important to study the writing of Maqamat from the perspective of the various disciplines of Islamic sciences and modern sciences. This study deals with fıqh and economic issues within the framework of Al-Hariri’s famous book, Maqamat. The aim of the study is to reveal the fıqh and economic aspects of Makamat writing through Hariri's Makamat as an exemplary study. The approach followed by the study is to select three maqama from Al-Hariri’s book, which contained fifty complete maqama, and to search for what is in them of fıqh and economics. Accordingly, the study includes three main headings, and in these three headings, fıqh, farâid (inheritance law) and economic issues are discussed, respectively. Although the science of farâid (inheritance law) is a branch of fıqh, it is singled out for mention independently because it has its own rulings. The study examined the jurisprudential aspect of the Maqamat in the thirty-second maqama called “the Tayyibi Maqamat,” the aspect related to the science of farâid in the fifteenth maqama called “the Faradiya Maqamat,” and the economic aspect in the forty-ninth maqama called “the Sassanid Maqamat.” The method followed by Hariri in her book is to present the issues in the form of stories through two fictional characters, Haris bin Hammam and Abu Zayd, whom she chose as mirrors reflecting the two opposing identities of the society. Abu Zaid appears in different forms and in various clothes. He sometimes appears as a beggar who deceives and a thief who betrays, and at other times as a preacher who advises and a scholar who guides. Rather, he is an imaginary character that Hariri put in place. Wherever he went, he met Al-Harith bin Hammam and the strange and adventurous incident begins, or he appears as a person from whom Al-Harith narrated the incident and the story. Harith is the person who always warns his against bad things, orders his to do good, and sometimes condemns his if he does evil. The results obtained in the study are, first of all, the determination that the Makâmât writing deals with the subjects of the science of fiqh as in the thirty-second makama and the subjects of the science of farâid (inheritance law) as in the fifteenth makama and the subjects of economics as in the forty-ninth makama. It is seen that some of the principles put forward by Adam Smith years later were also present in the Maqamat literature centuries ago. The fact that fiqh views are according to the Shafi'i sect shows that the Shafi'i sect was widespread in the region at that time. Additionally, as can be understood from the forty-ninth makama, there is also a profession of begging in the society where Hariri lives. The study also reveals the society's interest in, submission to, and acceptance of moral principles at that time, and shows that the Arabic language reached its peak during this period. (shrink)

Sometimes it is practically beneficial to believe what is epistemically unwarranted. Philosophers have taken these cases to raise the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but reasons to manage our beliefs in a particular way. Pragmatists are not convinced. They accept that some reasons for belief are practical. The debate, it is widely thought, is at an impasse. But this debate (...) fails to address what is puzzling and interesting about the cases. By focusing on reasons for belief, the debate completely overlooks the role of action in relation to belief. We should be talking about the reasons for actions that shape our beliefs, which I will call belief management. I argue for three related theses: the interesting cases that motivate the debate are about belief management; Evidentialism is irrelevant to belief management; agents have practical reasons to manage their beliefs with the aim of forming true beliefs. These reasons are categorical in nature and result in the tension of conflict cases. (shrink)

Apresentamos os conceitos de inércia, espaço e tempo na mecânica newtoniana. Analisamos o princípio de Mach, segundo o qual a inércia de qualquer corpo é devida a sua interação com os corpos distantes do universo. Em seguida explicamos porque, em geral, a teoria da gravitação de Einstein não implementa este princípio. Discutimos então o trabalho de Erwin Schrödinger que apresenta uma formulação alternativa para a mecânica baseada numa lei de Weber para a gravitação e que é compatível com as idéias (...) de Mach. (shrink)

Рассматривается понимание как специфически человеческий способ существования, как первичный, исходный опыт освоения человеком мира, в котором отсутствует субъект-объективная разделенность, лежащая в основе познавательного отношения. Для специалистов.

Construction and Schemata in Mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4..

In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis is ambitious on (...) two fronts. First, the parity thesis is a substantive thesis about the nature of belief and intention. I argue that there is a structural parity of belief and intention; the status of whether they are agential stands and falls together. Second, the parity thesis illuminates the nature of agency. It constrains what counts as a satisfactory account of agency: either we must accept agency of both belief and intention, or we must reject both. In the final section, I argue that we have prima facie reason to accept agency of belief and intention. Finally, I diagnose why there has been such resistance to epistemic agency. Epistemic agency is problematic, but its problems are problems with agency, not problems with epistemic agency. (shrink)